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Abstract
This Article will review the doctrine of moral right, which acknowledges a continuing re-
lationship between an author and his work, in Europe and the United States law that has been
applied in similar fact situations. It will then assess both the California and New York statutes that
grant rights similar to those of moral right, but only to visual and graphic artworks. Finally, it will
analyze the recent New York statute and compare it with both the California legislation and the
European doctrine.
NEW YORK ARTISTS' AUTHORSHIP
RIGHTS ACT INCORPORATES
EUROPEAN MORAL RIGHT
DOCTRINE
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INTRODUCTION
A Calder stabile displayed in the Pittsburgh airport is re-
painted in the county colors.' Members of a congregation be-
come offended by the emphasis on Christ's body in a mural
they had commissioned for their church and have it painted
over.2 The administrator of a famous sculptor's estate strips
some of the sculptor's later polychrome sculptures so that they
resemble his earlier and more popular unpainted works. The
work of award-winning book illustrators is revamped into a
placemat design.4 In each of these situations, a United States
artist is left with no practical recourse to reverse or redress the
destruction or alteration of his works because United States
law generally provides that an artist's relationship with his
work ceases once he sells the work.
In Europe, a distinction is made between the pecuniary
rights of an author in his work, or copyright, and his personal
rights in the work, or moral right.5 The moral right doctrine
* Associate, Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, P.C., Woodbridge, New Jersey. A.B.
1981, Princeton University; J.D. 1984, Vanderbilt University School of Law; Member,
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1. Rose, Calder's Pittsburgh.' A Violated and Immobile Mobile, Artnews, Jan. 1978,
at 39.
2. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1949).
3. Krauss, Changing the Work of David Smith, Art in America, Sept.-Oct. 1974, at
30; see Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1039-40
(1976).
4. Letter from Susan M. Dooha, Executive Director of the Graphic Artists Guild,
New York Chapter, to New York Governor Mario Cuomo, at 2 (June 10, 1983) (advo-
cating signature of the Artists' Authorship Rights Act). "Leo and Diane Dillon, 2-
time Caldecott Award winners, found that Dell used artwork from a book they had
illustrated, re-drawing it for use on a place mat." Id.
5. The term "moral right" is a translation of the French term "droit moral."
Given the confusing connotations of the term in English and the personal nature of
the rights involved, the German term "Urheberpers6'nlichkeitsrecht," translating as "cre-
ators' personality right," is more descriptive and its use would be more appropriate.
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acknowledges a continuing relationship between an author and
'his work. The doctrine also provides him with theoretically
perpetual and inalienable rights concerning that relationship
that are separate from ownership of the work or the copyright.
As expressed in the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works6 (Berne Convention), art interna-
tional copyright agreement which requires signatory nations to
provide for minimal moral right coverage, the most important
rights are paternity, or the right to be associated or dissociated
with one's work, and integrity, the right to preserve one's work
from damage or alteration.7 These rights serve not only to
protect the author's honor and reputation, but to further soci-
ety's interest in the preservation of its culture.
In the United States, moral right is not recognized as such.
In its place, a patchwork of legal theories provides relief that is
incomplete and uncertain for authors whose works have been
mutilated or misattributed. In response to this situation, the
California and New York Legislatures have enacted statutes
that grant rights similar to those of moral right, but only to
visual and graphic artworks.
This Article will review the doctrine of moral right in Eu-
rope8 and the United States law that has been applied in simi-
lar fact situations.9 It will then assess both the California and
New York legislation.'0 Finally, it will analyze the recent New
York statute and compare it with both the California legislation
and the European doctrine."1
I. THE DOCTRINE OF MORAL RIGHT
In common law nations through the beginning of the
twentieth century, an author' 2 had special protection for his
S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 575
(1935); Marcus, The Moral Right of the Artist in Germany, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (AS-
CAP) 93, 93 (1975). This Article nevertheless will comply with longstanding English
usage and will apply the term "moral right."
6. Latest revision July 24, 1971, 331 U.N.T.S. 218 [hereinafter cited a Berne Con-
vention].
7. Id. art. 6bis(i).
8. See infra notes 26-95 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 96-135 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 136-75 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 176-227 and accompanying text.
12. As used in this article, "author" is a broad term encompassing creators of all
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works only in copyright, which was granted by statute.1 3 Copy-
right affords protection only for the author's pecuniary interest
in his work by granting him a limited monopoly over the
work's economic exploitation. t4 The copyright itself is a prop-
erty right, is readily alienable, and may be exercised by anyone
who possesses it. 5 Copyright does not acknowledge the spe-
cial aspects of artistic creation. It treats the author in the same
manner as patent law treats the inventor, by failing to acknowl-
edge the expression of the author's personality in his work and
the continuing relationship between the author and his work
that necessarily persists even after the work or its copyright
have been alienated.' 6 For any causes of action against the
owners of the copyright or the work, the author must necessar-
ily rely on the recourse provided by contract or at common
law. ' 7
In civil law nations,' 8 the doctrine of moral right acknowl-
edges the continuing relationship between the author and his
work. It protects the author's personality by protecting his
works 9 and is of different duration and alienability than copy-
right.20 The touchstone of a claim under the moral right doc-
works, including sculptors, painters, poets, and songwriters as well as writers. Au-
thors in the common sense of the word, that is authors of written works, will be
specially denoted when required. This is the terminology used in the Berne Conven-
tion, supra note 6. See generally id
13. See generally B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 1-37 (1967).
14. Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French
Law, 16 AM.J. COMP. L. 465, 465 (1968). Of course, the author has recourse to any
other causes of action the law provides to any other person. See infra notes 96-135
and accompanying text.
15. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(l) (1982).
16. A work's status as an expression of the author's personality does not change
with the identity of its owner. After its creation, a work continues to represent a
stage in the artist's development and becomes a part of the oeuvre by which the public
judges the merit of the artist (and consequently sets the price of his work).
17. See infra notes 96-135 and accompanying text.
18. As used in this article, "civil law nations" refers to the continental European
countries, and the nations whose law is derived from their codes, excluding the so-
cialist nations.
19. Moral right also acknowledges society's interest in the preservation and de-
velopment of its culture. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study,in the Law of
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REV. 554, 578 (1940). This is one of the
prime legislative purposes of the California law. See infra notes 138-39 and accompa-
nying text.
20. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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trine is damage to an author's honor and reputation.2 ' Unless
this damage is present, an author will obtain no relief. 22 As for-
mulated by the courts and legislatures of civil law nations,2 "
particularly those of France, 24 the doctrine of moral right en-
compasses a "bundle of rights ' 25 protecting the author.
A. The "Bundle of Rights"
The most basic right that an author possesses is the right
to create or not to create. 26 This right is universally acknowl-
edged 27 and is an underlying conceptual basis for both moral
right and copyright. A corollary of the right to create is the
right of disclosure, which is the right to determine the time at
which a work shall be published,28 or made available to the
public. 29 Inasmuch as the author alone may create his work, he
alone may determine when, if ever, it is complete and ready to
be sold, reproduced, or otherwise consumed.3 0  He may even
have the right to modify a work after it has been sold. In a
leading French case on the right of publication, 3  an artist
21. See Stevenson, Moral Right and the Common Law: A Proposal, 6 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 89, 112 (1955).
22. See id.
23. Although the stereotypical view sees civil law courts as passive appliers of
legislation, the reality is somewhat more like the judicial activism of common law
countries. In France, the courts developed moral right throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, and continue to do so today. It was only in 1957 that the
doctrine was codified by the legislature. Sarraute, supra note 14, at 466; see S. LADAS,
supra note 5, at 1022.
24. It has been suggested that the French development of the moral right fol-
lowed the global preeminence of French art in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. Merryman, supra note 3, at 1042.
25. See S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 575. What rights are in the "bundle" may vary
by jurisdiction. See infra notes 63-67. The rights are not completely discrete; in a
given situation several of them may provide causes of action. Indeed, the rights have
been expressed as "phases" of a single right. S. LADAS, supra note 5, al 1023.
26. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 594.
27. Id. at 594-95. Respect for the author's right to create or not to create is not
only universal in nations recognizing a moral right, but is evident in the refusal of
common law nations to command specific performance of contracts mandating artis-
tic creation.
28. In this Article, "publication" is used not in the strict sense of reproducing a
book or article in print, but means the release of a work by an author for consump-
tion in whatever manner appropriate for the work. "Publication" indicates that the
author considers the work complete and that the process of creation is over.
29. Marcus, supra note 5, at 94; Sarraute, supra note 14, at 467.
30. Marcus, supra note 5, at 94; Sarraute, supra note 14, at 467.
31. Carco et autres v. Camoin et syndicat de la propriet6 artistique, Judgment of
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slashed some of his paintings with which he was dissatisfied
and discarded them. An enterprising art dealer found the
paintings, restored them, and sold them as the work of the art-
ist. Although the artist's copyright apparently had not been
violated, 32 the court found that the artist's moral right of publi-
cation prevented the restoration and sale of the canvasses he
had rejected. In another leading French case,3 4 an artist con-
tracted to paint a portrait. Prior to delivery of the work, the
artist had a dispute with the person who had commissioned the
portrait, declared himself dissatisfied with the work, painted
over the face of the portrait, and refused to deliver it. Notwith-
standing the suspect motivation of the artist's assertion of his
moral right, the court allowed the artist to keep the painting
but made him pay damages. 5 The right of publication is also
manifested in decisions requiring a publisher to publish within
a reasonable time a work he has accepted.3 6 Some nations
grant the literary author the additional right to withdraw his
work through rescission of a publication contract,3 7 or to mod-
ify the work3 8 after it has been published. There are severe
limitations on the exercise of these rights, which are rarely, if
ever, asserted.3 9
The right of paternity is the right to have authorship rec-
ognized or concealed by having the author's name associated
or not associated with his works.4" The rights or interests of
Mar. 6, 1931, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1931 Recueil Periodique et Critique [D.P.] II 88.
The case is discussed in Sarraute, supra note 14, at 468-69.
32. There is no mention in the case of unauthorized duplication of the works.
They had been abandoned by the artist, who had not reserved his copyright when he
"transferred" the works. See Sarraute, supra note 14, at 468-69.
33. The court ordered the restored works to be destroyed. This decision has
been criticized as extreme, as the artist's honor and reputation could arguably have
been protected by the depletion of his signature from the works. See id. at 469.
34. Eden v. Whistler, Judgment of Mar. 14, 1900, Cass. civ., 1900 D.P. I 497.
The case involves many factors and is discussed in Merryman, supra note 3, at 1024.
35. See Merryman, supra note 3, at 1024.
36. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 596.
37. In many countries this right is statutory. See S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 599.
In France, the right is a creation of the legislature and is infrequently if ever applied.
See Sarraute, supra note 14, at 466. In Germany, the right of withdrawal exists for
both written and visual works, although in a more limited form for the latter. Mar-
cus, supra note 5, at I11.
38. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 597.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 576. "The right to paternity is simply the right of the creator of a work
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other people will rarely counterbalance the right of paternity,
so the author's right is nearly supreme.4' There are three cir-
cumstances in which the right of paternity is commonly ap-
plied.42 The first occurs when a third party fails to identify the
author as such and leaves the work anonymous 43 even if he has
consented to earlier pseudonymous publication." The author
may insist that he be correctly identified. The impact of this
right is greatly cushioned by the courts' willingness to imply a
waiver of the right by the author particularly with respect to
newspaper or compendium writing.45 The right is not only
positive, but negative in that the author may demand that his
real name not be attached to one of his anonymous or pseu-
donymous works.46 The second circumstance occu is when a
third party's name is attributed to the author's work. This is
plagiarism which may be a violation of copyright as well as of
moral right."7 The final circumstance occurs when the author's
name is attributed to a work of a third party.4 8 The right of
paternity frequently conflicts with contracts requiring an au-
thor's production to be anonymous. European courts limit the
right in this situation. 9
The right to integrity ensures the author that no altera-
tion, whether by addition or omission, will be made to his work
without his consent.50 The author is injured when the public
takes the altered work to be his own and judges him accord-
ingly. When plainly stated, the right to integrity seems ex-
treme. For example, in the publishing and film industries edit-
to present himself before the public as such, to require others so to present him, and
to prevent others from attributing works to him which he has not devised." Roeder,
supra note 19, at 561-62.
41. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 586.
42. Id. at 585.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Roeder, supra note 19, at 564. In Germany, the courts will determine
whether waiver has occurred by looking to the customs and practices of the trade or
market involved. Marcus, supra note 5, at 100; see Roeder, supra note 19, at 564.
46. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 585; Roeder, supra note 19, at 562. The author's
desires control in this situation. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 585.
47. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 585-86.
48. Id. at 586.
49. See Marvin, The Author's Status in the United Kingdom and France. Common Law
and the Moral Right Doctrine, 20 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 675, 684-85 (1971).
50. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 586-87. The changes must of course damage the
author's honor and reputation to be actionable. Id. at 586.
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ing is a standard practice. 5' Reasonable limits are therefore im-
posed by the courts on the right to integrity in these areas. 2
In the case of the visual arts, small changes are likely to have a
greater effect and less justification, and are therefore less likely
to be tolerated by the courts. In a well-known French case,5" a
modern artist painted a series of panels that together deco-
rated a refrigerator. When one of the panels was offered at
auction without the other panels, the artist was able to prevent
the separate sale of the panel because it violated his right in
the integrity of his work.5" In a seminal German case, 55 an art-
ist had decorated the defendant's stairwell with frescoes of
nude sirens. 56 The defendant later modified the frescoes by
painting clothes on the sirens. The court found that the art-
ist's moral right had been violated and ordered the
overpainted clothes removed.57
Whether the right to integrity prevents the complete de-
struction of an artwork is open to discussion.58 While modified
or altered work may misrepresent an author or damage his
reputation, the absence of the work by itself arguably should
have no effect on the author.59 On the other hand, destruction
51. Opposition from the film and publishing industries has been the primary
reason moral right has made so little headway in the United States. See id. at 862;
Amarnick, American Recognition of the Moral Right: Issues and Options, 29 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 31, 43, 46-47 (1983).
52. For a review of the French law in this area, see generally Amarnick, supra
note 51, at 47-48; Sarraute, supra note 14, at 481; Stevenson, supra note 21, at 112.
For an overview of German law in this area, see Marcus, supra note 5, at 107. The
courts only recognize a consent to reasonable alteration of a work and not to any
extreme or unreasonable alterations. Merryman, supra note 3, at 1045. This ap-
proach reflects a balancing of author's rights with commercial reality.
53. Buffet v. Fersing, Judgment of May 30, 1962, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1962
Recueil DallozJurisprudence [D. Jur.] 570. The case is discussed in Merryman, supra
note 3, at 1023.
54. Merryman, supra note 3, at 1023 n.l.
55. Judgement ofJune 8, 1913, 79 Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 397. This
case is popularly known as Felseneiland mit Sirenen, "Rocky Island with Sirens," after
the topic of the frescoes. It is discussed in Marcus, supra note 5, at 104-05.
56. In dictum, the Felseneiland mit Sirenen court observed that if the frescoes had
been obscene, the public interest in morality might well have dictated their modifica-
tion. Marcus, supra note 5, at 104. This judicial attitude is not now as readily appar-
ent as it once was. See Marvin, supra note 49, at 688.
57. Marcus, supra note 5, at 104.
58. French law prohibits the destruction of an author's manuscript by a pub-
lisher. See Merryman, supra note 3, at 1035 n.37.
59. The means of the act of destruction may nullify this argument. In a French
case, Sudre v. Comune de Baixas, Judgment of Apr. 3, 1936, Conseil d'etat, 1936
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may be said to deprive the author of other rights in the "bun-
dle"6 and intuitively seems unacceptable. The European
courts have not squarely faced the issue,61 but in cases involv-
ing the decoration of buildings they have looked to the com-
peting interests of the works' owners. 62
In addition to the major rights listed above, there occur in
some nations miscellaneous rights that deserve mention. In
Germany, an author is guaranteed a right of access to his work
for the purpose of making reproductions or adaptations of it.63
In France, moral right will be used to justify a prohlibition of
excessive or abusive criticism. 64 This use correlates to United
States defamation and invasion of privacy law,65 and illustrates
the personal nature of moral right. Similarly, other acts that
might damage the author's honor or reputation may be forbid-
den.6 6
B. Remedies and Duration
Moral right without the European analogues of equitable
relief would be a hollow doctrine. The very nature of the dam-
age done to the author causes money damages to be specula-
tive at best and incalculable or inappropriate at worst. 67 The
D.P. III 57, the court found that a sculptor's right of integrity had been violated
notwithstanding the destruction of the work. His sculpture had been improperly
maintained and was subsequently broken up and used to fill potholes. The case is
discussed in Merryman, supra note 3, at 1034.
60. Merryman, supra note 3, at 1035.
61. Id.
62. In a French case, Lacasse et Welcome v. Abbe Quenard, Judgment of Apr.
27, 1934, Cour d' appel, Paris, 1934 Recueil Dalloz Hebdomadaire de jurisprudence
385, an artist's frescoes were obliterated and the court found that the property right
of the owner of the building outweighed the moral right of the artist. Merryman,
supra note 3, at 1034. This case suggests that rather than moral right being absolute,
it must be balanced against competing interests. Cf Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian
Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). Although the German
court in Felseneiland mit Sirenen, 79 RGZ 397, found a violation of the artist's moral
right, it stated in dictum that it would be acceptable for the owner to completely
destroy the work. The dictum was heavily criticized and seems to have been over-
riden by subsequent statutes. Marcus, supra note 5, at 105; see infra note 59 (discuss-
ing the right to access which would be defeated by destruction of the work).
63. Marcus, supra note 5, at 110-11. This is distinct from a right of modification.
64. See Marvin, supra note 49, at 693.
65. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
66. These acts are forbidden by the Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis; see
infra note 91 and accompanying text.
67. In 1940, a United States author observed that "[t]he injury suffered by the
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courts consequently rely on injunctions to prevent modifica-
tion or alteration of a work or to forbid public display of the
altered work. Courts have also ordered the restoration of a
work,68 and even its destruction.69 Courts may award money
damages in addition to injunctive or mandatory relief. One
other form of available relief is particularly appropriate for
damage to literary or theatrical works requiring interpretation.
This is a specialized "labelling remedy,"70 which involves a
specific acknowledgement, on display or publication, that the
work has been altered and does not fairly represent the au-
thor.7' This is less extreme for the author than an absolute
prohibition on the association of his name with the work as it
enables him to reject only selected parts of an otherwise ac-
ceptable work. This remedy is particularly appropriate where a
work is adapted 72 or depends on its context for its meaning,7"
and where the basic moral right doctrine would produce a
creator will not be measurable in dollars and cents, although it may well be irrepara-
ble. The violation of the moral right is very often continuous and the remedy at law
of no value whatsoever." Roeder, supra note 19, at 574. Time has since revealed that
difficulty in calculating damages is no bar to awarding them.
68. See Felseneiland mit Sirenen, 79 RGZ 397.
69. See Camoin v. Carco, judgment of Nov. 15, 1927, Trib. pr. inst., Paris, 1928
D.P. II 89; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
70. One author champions the labelling remedy and discusses it at great length
in an effort to make moral right more palatable to wary American lawyers. Amarnick,
supra note 51, at 52-56.
71. See, e.g., Leger v. Reunion des Th65tres Lyriques Nationaux, Judgment of
Oct. 15, 1954, Cour de Paris, (discussed in Marvin, supra note 49, at 695). In that
case, the producers of an opera deleted a scene for which the plaintiff had designed
the set and costumes. The court ordered that programs and posters for the opera
convey a message to that effect.
72. In a situation described in Amarnick, supra note 51, at 46-47, the authors of
the work from which the movie Wonder Bar was adapated forced the film's producers
to pay a large sum in exchange for the authors' promise not to exercise their moral
right, and forbid distribution of the film in countries adhering to the Berne Conven-
tion, supra note 6. The movie had already been released in the United States. If the
movie producers had consulted European law they would presumably have extracted
the authors' consent to adapt the work.
73. In the 1940's and 1950's, a group of Soviet composers brought suit in
France and the United States against the producers of an anti-Soviet movie, The Iron
Curtain, to redress the use of their music in that context. Soci6t6 Le Chant du Mond
v. Soci~t~s Fox Europe et Fox Amricaine Twentieth Century, Judgment of Feb. 19,
1952, Cour d'appel, Paris (discussed in Merryman, supra note 3, at 1039). In Shos-
takovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949), the court found no moral
right and hence no violation. See Amarnick, supra note 51, at 53-54; Merryman, supra
note 3, at 1039. Presumably the moral right would address other contextual distor-
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harsh result. On the other hand, the remedy is less appropri-
ate if the altered part cannot be easily separated from the intact
parts of the work. In that case, the danger that the author will
be judged by the work is much greater.
The duration of a moral right depends on the theoretical
basis of the rights. There are two major schools of t:hought on
this topic. Germany adheres to the monist theory, which holds
that moral right and copyright are part of a unified whole that
encompasses rights of different qualities. 4 Because moral
right and copyright are manifestations of the same right, it fol-
lows that they should have the same duration. In Germany,
the moral right therefore expires with the copyright.75 France,
as well as most civil law nations, adheres to a dualist approach,
which views the moral right and copyright as mutually in-
dependent rights arising from a work.76 Consequently, the two
rights may have different durations. The nature of the interest
protected dictates that moral right should be perpetual in du-
ration.77 There are, of course, tremendous practical difficulties
involved in a perpetual moral right, such as who is to exercise
it78 and to what ends.79
The moral right may be bequeathed or passed to heirs by
inheritance, just as may the copyright. Again the differences
tions, such as the arrangement of other works accompanying a work in a gallery, or
the environment of a multimedia work. See Amarnick, supra note 51, at 55-56.
74. Marcus, supra note 5, at 95. German scholars tend to view the French ap-
proach as functionally very close to monism. Id. Nevertheless the two schools pre-
scribe different durations for moral right. This is the principal practical difference
between the two theories. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 578.
75. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 115. The term extends for the life of the author
plus seventy years. Id. Nevertheless, more general principles of German law support
the proposition that "a person who has appropriated the work of a dead author that
has fallen into the public domain, and presented it under his own name, could be
sued by other authors or by authors professional organizations .... ." Micha6lids-
Nouaros, Protection of the Author's Moral Interests After His Death as a Ciltural Postulate,
1979 COPYRIGHT 35, 39; see infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
76. S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 578. Nevertheless, moral right has a dominant
position over the copyright. Marcus, supra note 5, at 95.
77. See Sarraute, supra note 14, at 483. This is primarily the author's honor and
reputation. On this basis alone, the moral right arguably should expire on the au-
thor's death. Marcus, supra note 5, at 115. When the social interest in the preserva-
tion of culture is considered, however, the moral right unquestionably should be per-
petual. Id.
78. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
79. The interests of the heirs of an author may prescribe alteration of a work.
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 1040-41 (discussing the works of David Smith).
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between monism and dualism are relevant. 80 Monist nations
view moral right as passing absolutely to the new owner, who
may exercise it without restriction as if he were the author.81
While this system is simple and predictable 82 it does not ac-
knowledge the shift in the balance of social and individual in-
terests that occurs when an author dies.
[M]oral rights post mortem, while retaining their main charac-
teristics (inalienability, unattachability, etc.) and while re-
maining within the sphere of private law, undergo a change
in nature. . . They cease to be sovereign rights of abso-
lute and individualistic character, changing into relative, al-
truistic rights, the respect of which is dictated by the inter-
ests of culture, and the abuse of which must be controlled
by the courts.83
To account for this shift, the dualist nations employ more
complex systems. In these systems, the rights of the "bundle"
may survive to varying degrees,84 or the holder of the moral
right may be required to exercise it according to the best inter-
ests of the author,85 or the court or authors' associations may
80. See Micha~lids-Nouaros, supra note 75, at 35-36. Not all rights in the "bun-
dle" survive to the same extent. See infra note 84.
81. Micha~lids-Nouaros, supra note 75, at 35.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id. The author's bias is evident in that while the quoted language is
presented as conclusions based on analysis of the relevant laws, it clearly reflects the
French dualist approach.
84. In France, the right of publication may be exercised by the author's execu-
tors during their lives, and by others chosen according to a statutory scheme thereaf-
ter. The right may only be exercised with respect to works whose publication was not
specifically forbidden by the author. The right of integrity may be freely bequeathed,
and survives unchanged, as does the right of paternity. Micha~lids-Nouaros, supra
note 75, at 37. The right of withdrawal perishes with the author. See id.; see also
Sarraute, supra note 14, at 483 (discussing duration of moral right).
85. See Micha~lid s-Nouaros, supra note 75, at 38. Such a limit prevents abuse of
the right of disclosure by heirs in France. Id. French courts will hold against heirs
who seek to exercise their moral right for their own benefit and not according to the
dead author's wishes. Sarraute, supra note 14, at 483. In Germany and Italy, an exec-
utor may be removed for a violation of his duties. One commentator sees a need for
additional legislation in this area:
[H]eirs have the status of legal representatives and a function similar to that
of an executor; therefore the civil courts should be given the right, de lege
ferenda, to declare the disqualification of heirs for that function where, as a
result of error or inability, they have shown themselves unworthy of per-
forming the tasks entrusted to them by the law.
Micha~lids-Nouaros, supra note 75, at 38.
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share in the exercise of the moral right.86 Once the author's
work passes into the public domain and there are no heirs or
holders of the moral right, only associations will be able to
protect the moral right. The extent to which authors' associa-
tions, whether private or state-created, may exercise the moral
right of deceased authors is questionable.87 Concerns over
state regulation of culture loom large88 but the alternative of
no protection of works in the public domain is more unpalat-
able. Consequently, commentators favor the exercise of the
moral right by authors' associations.
II. THE BERNE CONVENTION
The Berne Convention is an international copyright union
to which many of the nations of the world adhere.89 The
United States is a conspicuous exception. Article 6bis of the
Convention provides for recognition of moral right by member
states.90 The Convention embodies a minimal level of moral
right protection, as it preserves only the paternity and integrity
rights and includes a general prohibition against other acts
prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation.9 Although
the Convention requires the moral right to be preserved at
86. Micha~lid~s-Nouaros, supra note 75, at 37. In France, the courts oversee the
exercise of the right of disclosure. Id.
87. The French National Literary Fund was created by statute in .1946 to protect
the integrity of literary works in the public domain. Sarraute, supra note 14, at 484.
Nevertheless, the Fund was unable to sue for the confiscation of a distorted novel
because heirs of the author were still alive and had the first right to sue. Id. The
concerns of society and the perpetuity of moral right demand, in the opinions of the
commentators, that such an exercise of moral right be possible. S. LADAS, supra note
5, at 602; Merryman, supra note 3, at 1041-43; Sarraute, supra note 14, at 483.
88. This is a special fear in Germany because of Nazi efforts in ihis area. Mar-
cus, supra note 5, at 115-16.
89. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Conwention and the
United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 499 (1967). "Since [1886] most of
the significant nations of the world have acceded to the Convention .... " Id.
90. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis. Article 6bis was first incorporated
into the Berne Convention through the Rome Act of 1928, and was most recently
modified by the Stockholm Act of 1967.
91. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis(l). This article provides that:
Independently of the author's copyright, and even after the transfer of said
copyright, the author shall have the right . . . to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other alteration thereof,
or any other action in relation to the said work which would be prejudicial to
his honour or reputation.
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least as long as the author's copyright, it defers to those states
whose preexisting legislation provides a different duration for
moral right.92 Article 6bis fails to specify the contents of the
rights it names, however, and its final clause allows member
states to legislate the means for redress.93 Consequently,
either strong or weak protections may fit within the broad arti-
cle 6bis language so long as they at least recognize the listed
rights.94 There is not even a requirement that the moral rights
be inalienable. 95
III. PROTECTIONS COMPARABLE TO MORAL RIGHT IN
UNITED STATES LAW
There has been a great debate on the issue of whether
United States federal and state noncopyright statutes and com-
mon law currently provide protection equivalent to moral
right,96 and whether the United States would thereby be able
92. Id. art. 6bis(2). This article provides that:
In so far as the legislation of the countries . . . permits, the rights granted
to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his
death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the copyright, and shall be
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the said legislation.
The determination of the conditions under which the rights mentioned in
this paragraph shall be exercised shall be governed by the legislation of the
countries of the Union.
Id. Thus the duration requirements of both the monist and dualist countries are
accommodated.
93. Id. art. 6bis; see Nimmer, supra note 89, at 552. Article 6bis(3) states that
"[t]he means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed." Berne Con-
vention, supra note 6, art. 6bis(3).
94. Nimmer, supra note 89, at 522. "A [Berne Copyright] Union member may
not simply ignore the provisions of article 6b/s, but whether those provisions are to
be liberally or narrowly construed is a matter for individual national determination."
Id.
95. Id. at 524. The legislative materials of article 6bis and of its modifications
leave the matter of alienability up to the legislatures of member nations. Id.
96. Some commentators support the proposition that United States law suffi-
ciently approximates moral right to allow accession to the Berne Convention. See,
e.g., id. at 518-19; STRAUSS, THE MORAL RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR, STUDY No. 4, in Copy-
RIGHT OFFICE, LIB. OF CONG., STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SEN., 86TH
CONG., IST SESS. (Comm. Print 1960); Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's
"Moral Right" 16 AM.J. COMP. L. 487 (1968). Others disagree. See, e.g., Merryman,
supra note 3, at 1049.
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to ratify the Berne Convention without further legislation.9 7
Even though the 1976 Copyright Act 8 does not provide moral
rights for authors, it does not preempt state legislation or com-
mon law in the area.9 9 After some encouraging language in
opinions at the start of the twentieth century,' 00 Unir~ed States
courts have rejected moral right when squarely confronted
with the issue.' 0 ' Nevertheless, there are already a number of
97. Of course, this issue embraces more than the moral right issue alone. See
generally S. Ladas, supra note 5, at 862-76.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
99. Id. § 301 (1982). This section provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under
the common law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . .or...
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106.
(d) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under
any other Federal statute.
Section 106 provides no moral right protections. Id. § 106. But see Nimmer, supra
note 89, at 518 n.107.
100. See, e.g., Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 183-84 122 N.Y.S.
206, 207-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910).
Even the matter-of-fact attitude of the law does not require us to consider
the sale of the rights to a literary production in the same way that we would
consider the sale of a barrel of pork. . . . If the intent of the parties was
that the defendant should purchase the rights to the literary property and
publish it, the author is entitled not only to be paid for his work, bui to have
it published in the manner in which he wrote it. The purchaser canno, garble it
or put it out under another name than the author's; nor can he omit altogether the name
of the author, unless his contract with the latter permits him so to do.
The position of the author is somewhat akin to that of an actor. The
fact that he is permitted to have his work published under his name, or to
perform before the public, necessarily affects his reputation and standing, and thus
impairs or increases his future earning capacity.
Id. (emphasis added). Note the ultimate concern is not honor and reputation, but
pecuniary gain. Fo a further discussion of this case, see infra note 102 and accompa-
nying text.
101. See Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1952); Vargas
v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian
Church, 194 Misc. 570, 576, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); Meliodon v.
School District of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 457, 460, 195 A. 905, 906 (19 '8).
In Crimi, a congregation commissioned a fresco of Christ for their church. The
contract with the artist assigned all copyright to the church and provided that the
frsco would be part of the church building. Eight years after its completion, the con-
gregation painted over the fresco without giving notice to the artist. The artist sued,
seeking either the removal of the obliterating paint, the removal of the entire fresco
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common law tort and contract doctrines that provide relief in
situations where moral right is implicated.
Breach of contract may be used to remedy paternity 0 2 and
integrity0 3 problems in United States courts, but it involves
certain difficulties. Relief is only available where a direct con-
tractual relationship exists between the author and the poten-
at his expense, or damages. 194 Misc. at 572, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815. He asserted that
the obligation: 1) violated custom and usage incorporated in the original contract;
2) violated the artist's continuing right of integrity in the work; and 3) was against
public policy. Id. In its discussion of moral right, the court noted both LacasseJudg-
ment of Apr. 27, 1934, Cour d'Appel, Paris, 1934 Recueil Dalloz Hebdomadaire de
Jurisprudence 385, and Vargas v. Esquire Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947). The
court ultimately found that the artist had no continuing right in the work, and should
have reserved the rights he desired by contract. Crimi, 194 Misc. at 574-75, 89
N.Y.S.2d at 819.
In Meliodon, a sculptor hired by the School District to create sculpture for the
Board of Education building brought suit when his works were altered so that he felt
ridiculed and caused him to lose contracts for the decoration of other buildings. 328
Pa. at 458, 195 A. at 905. The sculptor sought damages and the destruction of the
altered works. The court did not directly discuss the issue of moral right, but mis-
missed the complaint, holding that since the claim was in the nature of tort, the
school district as a governmental agency was immune from liability. Id. at 458-59,
195 A. at 906.
102. In Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1910), appeal denied sub nom Taylor v. Crawford, 124 N.Y.S. 1131 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1910) plaintiff, a writer, sold a story to defendant who printed galley proofs of it
with plaintiffs name shown as author. Defendant later decided to publish the story
without plaintiffs name, and when plaintiff insisted that the story be attributed to
him, defendant refused to pay the contract price. The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint. The Appellate Term, finding that the contract was complete, reversed and
ordered a new trial. Judge Gavegan opined that "[t]itle to the manuscript having
passed. . . plaintiff [could not] compel or prevent its publication, with or without his
name." 67 Misc. at 185, 122 N.Y.S. at 207 (Gavegan,J., concurring). The frequently
cited language comes from Judge Seabury's opinion. See supra note 100. The re-
maining justice dissented.
103. In Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952), plaintiff, a well-known
promoter, made master recordings of one of his concerts and sold them to defendant
for reproduction. The sale contract provided that any records produced were to be
identified as plaintiffs production. When defendant sold edited versions of the re-
cordings and attributed them to plaintiff, plaintiff filed suit and lost. On appeal, the
circuit court reversed, finding defendant had breached the sales contract. Id. "This
contractual duty [to identify plaintiff as producer] carries by implication . . . the duty
not to sell records which make the required legend a false representation." Id. at
588. In his concurrence, Judge Frank acknowledged plaintiff's effort to invoke the
doctrine of moral right, discussed the possibility of its acceptance in the United
States, and concluded "[w]ithout rejecting the doctrine of 'moral right' . . . we
should not rest decision on that doctrine where, as here, it is not necessary to do so."
Id. at 591 (Frank, J., concurring); see also De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168
A.D. 452, 153 N.Y.S. 1066 (1915) (protecting the integrity of a work); infra note 107.
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tial defendant. 1 4  Thus, an artist whose work may pass
through many hands would have no recourse against a distant
owner. This problem can be resolved by inclusion of appropri-
ate language into sales contracts. 0 5 This protection would not
be readily available to new or unknown authors because of
their very limited bargaining power with purchasers.1 6 In as-
serting their moral rights through contract law, authors must
therefore rely on the mercy of the courts which can only en-
courage ad hoc results. There are also many cases in which
narrowly drawn contracts are construed in favor of the pur-
chaser or publisher. 0 7 In sum, breach of contract can. provide
104. Those in privity may sue on a contract. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CON-
TRACTS § 17-1 (2nd ed. 1977). Where a licensing agreement has been breached, the
copyright statute provides a remedy. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" o] Authors and
Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 263-64 (1978).
105. Ensuring recourse against distant owners is possible but because it neces-
sarily relies on the actions of others, it is very difficult to achieve.
The provision of moral rights which are enforceable against subsequent purchas-
ers of a work would be based on a covenant by the initial purchaser that he will make
any sale of the work contingent upon the subsequent purchaser's acceptance of the
relevant covenants. Such a provision could be enforceable against the initial pur-
chaser alone. If the initial purchaser were to breach it, the author would be denied
the equitable remedies which are the major attraction of moral right, although he
would have a claim for damages.
Given the sparse legal basis for asserting moral rights in most common law juris-
dictions, contractual language must explicitly describe the rights and duties the au-
thor desires. To set the context for a court's interpretation of an agreement incorpo-
rating moral rights, the drafter should include extensive recitations as to the parties
understanding of the continuing and vital relationship between the work and its crea-
tor. These recitations are important in justifying the application of equitable reme-
dies.
106. By virtue of their continuous presence in the market, publishers and pur-
chasers can draw on their experience to draft onerous "boilerplate" contracts.
Where purchasers and publishers are few, powerful, or have captured large portions
of the market, they may force authors to accept adhesion contracts. SeeJ. C. ALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, supra note 104, § 1-3.
107. In the reknowned case of Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.
1947), the plaintiff, an artist, produced drawings of women which were published by
defendant magazine and identified by plaintiffs pseudonym as "Vargas Girls." The
contract between the parties provided that defendant had all right in the drawings
and the names by which they were identified. When defendant renamed the draw-
ings "Esquire Girls" and ceased to identify them as plaintiff's work, plaintiff brought
suit for breach of contract and unfair competition. The court also refused to accept
plaintiffs moral right argument. Id. at 526.
In De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168 A.D. 452, 153 N.Y.S. 1066 (1915),
the plaintiff, a writer, entered into a sales contract with defendant which provided
that plaintiffs encyclopedia of music was to be published under defendant's name.
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the same results as moral right but only to those authors who
are able to protect themselves by means of their sufficient bar-
gaining power.'0 8
An author injured by excessive or abusive criticism may
proceed on a theory of defamation. However, as with breach
of contract, there are numerous ways in which defamation can-
not provide the protection afforded by moral right. Injunctive
relief is generally not available for defamation,0 9 and the re-
sultant damage to an author's career, especially if his career is
nascent, can be incompensable. The action is available only to
living authors," 0 which makes its protection less durable than
that of copyright and a far cry from the perpetual protection
provided in some nations.' The author must also have a rep-
utation to serve as a yardstick for damages,' 2 a requirement
which places heavy burdens on unknown authors who are least
able to bear them. Finally, the higher standard of proof that
public figures must meet," t3 coupled with the use of the rele-
vant community to define the action, 4 limits the availability of
defamation to well-known authors. One commentator has ob-
served that an author seeking to enforce his moral rights by
means of libel would nearly always qualify as a public figure." 15
In sum, because of the unavailability of injunctive relief and
the problems of proof involved, defamation provides a weak
device to enforce moral rights.
The right to privacy has also been used to protect moral
When the book was published under the name of a third party with additions not of
the plaintiffs making, plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract. The court re-
versed the trial court's findings for defendant on the grounds that the damages were
excessive, and ordered a new trial. Id. at 456, 153 N.Y.S. at 1068. The court ob-
served that the plaintiff was entitled under the contract to have the work published
without additions under the defendant's name, thus denying plaintiffs argument that
conditions implying the use of plaintiffs name should be implied into the contract.
Id. at 455, 153 N.Y.S. at 1068.
108. See generally Diamond, supra note 104, at 261-63.
109. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 772-73 (5th ed. 1984).
110. Id. at 778.
111. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
112. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 109, at 843.
113. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 109, at 805-07.
114. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 109, at 777-78.
115. Diamond, supra note 104, at 265. The author cites cases showing examples
of the broad range of literary figures that have been considered public for the pur-
poses of defamation.
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right interests. It overlaps defamation extensively, 16 and suf-
fers from similar shortcomings. At common law, only a living
author may sue for a breach of his privacy, 1 7 and he may do so
to protect himself, not his work, from "an assault upon his own
feelings."' 8 The most relevant branches of the doctrine are
"false light," in which the plaintiff is placed in a false light in
the public eye," 9 and attribution, in which the defendant ap-
propriates the plaintiffs name or likeness for his own bene-
fit. 12 0 A number of states have enacted statutes that articulate
the right to privacy.' 2 ' Privacy is best able to redress violations
of an author's paternity right when an author's name is associ-
ated with the work of another person, but it is not able to re-
quire that an author's name be associated with his work. Pri-
vacy has also been used to vindicate breaches of the right to
integrity, 22 but because the focus of privacy is on the author,
protection of the work is not a goal in itself, and may not nec-
essarily result.
116. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 109, at 864.
117. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 815 (4th ed. 1971). Several states provide
by statute for privacy actions on the behalf of deceased persons. Id.; se infra note
121. It is of course conceivable that family members would suffer from a breach of a
deceased author's privacy, in which case they would have causes of action in their
own rights. W. PROSSER, supra, at 814-15.
118. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197 (1890);
Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing
American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1549 (1972).
119. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 109, at 863. The seminal case in this
area, Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816), involved the paternity right.
Lord Byron succeeded in enjoining the publication and circulation of an inferior
poem falsely attributed to him. Id. at 852.
120. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 109, at 851. Another branch of pri-
vacy is the "public disclosure of private facts." See id at 856. In Ellis v. Hurst, 66
Misc. 235, 121 N.Y.S. 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910), an author successfully enjoined pub-
lication under his own name of a work originally published pseudonymously. Id. at
237, 121 N.Y.S. at 440. The case was decided under the New York privacy statute.
Id. at 236, 121 N.Y.S. at 439.
121. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Civ. ]RIGHTS LAW
§ 50 (McKinney 1976). The New York law, dating from 1909, forbids the use of the
name or picture of a living person for advertising or trade purposes without permis-
sion. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. The trade purposes limitation ostensibly
would prevent recovery for the destruction of the mural in Crimi, 194 Misc. 570, 89
N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); see supra note 101. CAL. CIv. CODIZ § 3344, is
substantially the same except that injunctive relief is not specifically provided.
122. In Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1933), the court
reversed a judgment against an artist, whose painting of a ship was crudely repro-
duced by defendant and marketed as a sewing pattern for cushions, and ordered a
new trial. The court based its decision on the New York privacy statute, N.Y. Civ.
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Unfair competition has also been used to redress viola-
tions of a moral right, but as with defamation and privacy, it
does not focus on protecting the work except as a means to
some other end. In unfair competition, the focus is on protect-
ing the author from being deprived of his market, 23 or on pro-
tecting the public from being misled or deceived. 24  Courts
have granted relief for breaches of paternity and integrity
rights by means of unfair competition as defined in the com-
mon law,' 25 or state 26 or federal 2 7 statutes. The closest a
court has come to embracing moral right as a doctrine was in
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies,' 28 in which the Sec-
RIGHTS LAW § 51, and not on the artist's proffered argument of "infringement of his
artistic property." 65 F.2d at 364.
In Gieseking v. Urania Records, 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1956), a reknowned pianist brought suit under N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51
against a defendant who had made unauthorized inferior reproductions of plaintiff's
performances. Plaintiff also made a claim on grounds of unfair competition because
defendant had made unauthorized reproductions of tapes of performances not made
for that purpose. In refusing to dismiss the case, the court observed that "[a] per-
former has a property right in his performance that it shall not be used . . . in a
manner which does not fairly represent his service." 17 Misc. 2d at 1035, 155
N.Y.S.2d at 172.
123. Roeder, supra note 19, at 568.
124. Diamond, supra note 104, at 266.
125. In Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939),
plaintiff, author of the novel "Stella Dallas," brought suit against defendant because
its creation and broadcasting of radio episodes based on the novel were of inferior
artistic and commercial quality. The action was not brought under the Copyright
Act. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the court observed that even
though the parties were not direct competitors, the facts alleged could well fit within
the doctrine of unfair competition. Id. at 266. "It is the injury to the author and a
fraud upon the reading public that constitute the real offense alleged." Id. The hold-
ing in Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952), was based on unfair competition
as well as on contract. See supra note 103.
126. In Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 543, 364 N.E.2d
570 (1977), plaintiffs, The Ohio Players, sought and received an injunction against
the distribution of an album attributed to plaintiffs which contained songs written,
performed, or added to by others. The case was decided under Illinois' enactment of
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 547, 364 N.E.2d 575.
127. The relevant federal statute is § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1976). For cases applying the Lanham Act, see Diamond, supra note 104,
at 267. There is some question as to whether the Lanham Act is a federal unfair
competition law. See Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enterprises, Inc., of California, 160
F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958). But see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d
14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
128. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). Plaintiffs, the "Monty Python" group, unsuc-
cessfully sought to enjoin defendant's broadcast of heavily edited (27% cut) Monty
Python programs. On appeal, the three-judge panel noted that defendant's right to
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ond Circuit Court of Appeals expanded section 45(a) of the
Lanham Trademark Act 129 to incorporate the doctrine of
moral right. Given the past explicit rejection of moral right in
the Second Circuit 130 and the alternative theory of liability
based on copyright infringement,' 3 ' courts have been reluctant
to follow the moral right language of the decision.132 The Lan-
ham Act alone, however, has been used extensively to provide
relief. 3 3  Nevertheless, the Lanham Act and unfair competi-
broadcast the shows ultimately flowed from the plaintiffs' licensing arrangement with
the British Broadcasting Corporation, which permitted only minor modification of
plaintiffs work without plaintiffs oversight and consent. Id. at 17. Because defend-
ant could not have received the right to edit the shows heavily without plaintiffs
consent, the court reversed and granted the preliminary injunction. Id. at 26.
The court provided an additional and ostensibly independent line of reasoning
in support of its holding. "[Aippellants [Monty Python] will succeed on the theory
that. . . the cuts made constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty Python's work.
This cause of action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist's work, finds its
roots in the continental concept of droit moral, or moral right .... . Id. at 23-24.
The court discussed moral right in general and the United States law in the area, and
concluded that "an allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a 'gar-
bled,' . . . distorted version of plaintiffs work seeks to redress the very rights sought
to be protected by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and should be recognized as
stating a cause of action under that statute." Id. at 24-25 (quoting Granz v. Harris,
198 F.2d at 591 (Frank, J., concurring)). In his concurrence, Judge Curfein agreed
with the views expressed on the plaintiffs Lanham Act complaint but observed that
the Act "is not a substitute for droit moral .... [T]he Lanham Act does not deal with
artistic integrity. It only goes to misdescription of origin and the like." Id. at 27
(Gurfein, J., concurring). This aspect of the majority's opinion has been similarly
criticized elsewhere. See Diamond, supra note 104, at 268-69.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). Section 43(2) of the Lanham Act reads in per-
tinent part:
Any person who shall. . . use in connection with any goods or servlices, .
a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, .
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, . . . shall be
liable to a civil action . . . by any person who believes that he is or is likely
to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id.
130. See Miller v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962); Granz v. Harris,
198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570,
89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949).
131. See supra note 128.
132. This aspect of the decision has only been followed once in the federal
courts. In Follett v. New American Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
the court cited Gilliam for its use of the Lanham Act to prevent the presentation of an
author's work in distorted form, and enjoined distribution of a book that identified as
primary author a popular novelist who had merely edited the work. Id. at 313.
133. See Comment, Monty Python and the Lanham Act: In Search of the Moral Right,
30 RUTGERS L. REV. 452, 474-76 (1977).
382 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:362
tion in general seem to be poor substitutes for the doctrine of
moral right.
Intellectually their thrust is different as they only protect
economic interests of the author and public. 34 Unknown art-
ists are vulnerable even under these approaches, as they have
little or no present market for their works, or have little public
recognition. The absence of decisions relying on Gilliam's ex-
pansion of the Lanham Act indicates that there will probably
be little future growth in this direction.
In conclusion, United States law provides some remedy
for breach of moral right, but the available devices differ
widely in their applicability, duration, and remedy. 35 None of
the available remedies acknowledge protection of works of au-
thorship as a goal in itself, but rather see it only as a means to
some other end. The remedies, consequently, may not always
provide adequate results. Further, the unknown author has lit-
tle redress under any of the theories, not in the least because
of the costs and the risks of pursuing litigation in such ambigu-
ous areas of the law. Even if the remedies are conceded to be
adequate, codification would add consistency and predictabil-
ity that would better serve the objectives of moral right than
the current patchwork of remedies.
A. The California Art Preservation Act
The California Legislature moved to address the short-
comings of United States protection of artists' moral rights by
passing the California Art Preservation Act 13 6 (CAPA) in
1979.137 In CAPA, the legislature specifically recognized the
close connection between an artist's work and his personality,
and the principle that damage to a work can result in damage
to an artist. 138 Both of these principles are basic to moral
134. See supra notes 96-135 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
136. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1984). The California Art Preservation
Act (CAPA) applies only to works of fine art, and not to literary works. Id.
§ 987(b)(2). The term "artist" refers to authors of works of fine art. Id. § 987(b)(1);
see infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
137. Although California is not the only state to have made efforts in this area,
see Note, The Americanization of Droit Moral in the California Art Preservation Act, 15
N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 901, 910 n.34 (1983), it and New York are the only ones to
date that have passed any legislation.
138. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a). This recognition was expressed as follows:
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right. The legislature also recognized "a public interest in pre-
serving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations."' 39
CAPA is hardly an enactment of moral right, however, and
provides more limited protection to an artist and his 'work than
he would enjoy in Europe. 40 The most dramatic limitation of
CAPA's scope is its applicability to "fine art" alone. 14  As de-
fined in the Act, " '[f]ine art' means an original painting, sculp-
ture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized
quality, but shall not include work prepared under contract for
commercial use by its purchaser."' 142 Literary, musical, and
cinematic works, as well as crafts, original prints and litho-
graphs, are completely excluded. The same is true for less
traditional forms of art that arguably do not fit within the listed
categories. 43 The requirement of "recognized quality" also
militates against innovative or unpopular works of ariL, because
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical alteration or de-
struction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's personality, is det-
rimental to the artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in
protecting their works of fine art against such alteration or destruction; and
that there is also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and
artistic creations.
Id.
139. Id. For an exhaustive discussion of the general recognition of this interest
in the United States, see Note, supra note 137, at 912 n.50.
140. Note, supra note 137, at 909-10, 947-48; see Merryman, supra note 3, at
1042-43. It is felt that the public interest evident in CAPA, see supra note 138, re-
quires a synthesis of moral right and United States law rather than a mere addition of
the two. Note, supra note 137, at 909-10.
141. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a).
142. Id. § 987(b)(2) (emphasis added). This limitation was imposed by political
necessity. See Note, supra note 137, at 923. The pressures to which the lawmakers
were subject are evident in the addition in 1982 of the language referring to works in
glass, and of similar language in § 997, which provides that "[i]n this state, for any
purpose, porcelain painting and stained glass artistry shall be considered a fine art
and not a craft." CAL. CIv. CODE § 997.
143. Examples of these are conceptual art, in which the process of creation and
the aging of the work are considered the art, see Note, Artworks and American Law: The
California Art Preservation Act, 61 B.U.L. REV. 1201, 1220 n. 11 (1981), or landscape
art such as the Lake Placid Summer Olympics "ground sculpture," see N.Y. Times,
May 16, 1980, at C24, col. 2.
The exclusion of limited edition prints and other works that are not unique indi-
cates that the social interest in the integrity of culture is paramount. That interest is
served by the intact survival of a single individual of a serial work. In contrast, the
artist's interest is disserved by the damage of a single individual.
In any event, the specificity of the list in CAL. CIV. CODE 987(b)(2) and the sub-
sequent additions to it, see id., will suggest to the courts that the California Legisla-
ture intended the categories to be exclusive and the statute narrowly construed.
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"recognized quality" is determined by the trier of fact and not
by a panel of experts. 44 The exclusion of works for commer-
cial use is consistent with the treatment of "works for hire"
under the Copyright Act of 1976,' 4 ' although CAPA limits the
exclusion to works for use in advertising, print, and electronic
media.' 46 A final limitation on the scope of CAPA is the spe-
cial provision for works of fine art that are integral parts of
buildings and are not easily removed therefrom. 47 In the case
of a work that cannot be removed from its site intact, CAPA
provides that the artist's rights are deemed waived unless they
are specifically reserved.' 48 This is an exception to the general
rule that an artist may only waive his rights under CAPA in
144. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(f. "In determining whether a work of fine art is of
recognized quality, the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers,
collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, and other persons involved with the
creation or marketing of fine art." Id. This limitation seems to be a practical neces-
sity, given the diversity of opinions as to the merit of works in borderline areas. The
process avoids the twin evils of overly explicit judgment by the legislature and the
delegation of the definition of absolute qualitative standards of culture to an in-
dependent government body. See supra text accompanying note 88. Nevertheless,
the process is imprecise at best, and courts would doubtless welcome a list of criteria
to consider. See Note, supra note 137, at 926. Under moral right, no qualitative stan-
dards are formally considered.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). This Act provides that the copyright of works
made for hire resides in the employer. Id.
146. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(7) (added by amendment, 1982). CAPA applies
only to "commercial use" and such use is defined as meaning "fine art created under
a work-for-hire arrangement for use in advertising, magazines, newspapers, or other
print and electronic media." Id. Thus it would seem that the plaintiff in Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947), would have fared no better under CAPA
than he did in fact. See supra note 107. On the other hand, the artist in Meliodon v.
School District of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938), might well have pre-
vailed. See supra note 101.
147. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(h)(1). The limitation is expressed as follows:
If a work of fine art cannot be removed from a building without substantial
physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of such work, the
rights and duties created under this section, unless expressly reserved by an
instrument in writing signed by the owner of such building and properly
recorded, shall be deemed waived. Such instrument, if properly recorded,
shall be binding on subsequent owners of such building.
Id. The recordation referred to is presumably in the title records. If the building
owner gives 90 days' notice and the artist fails to remove the work, no action may be
brought under CAPA. Id. § 987(h)(2).
148. Id. § 987(h)(1). In Crimi, 194 Misc. at 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 813, the artist
offered to remove his mural at his own expense. Thus even if he had waived his
rights under CAPA, it would seem that the mural was removable and thus was not
within § 987(h)(1). Relief would therefore have been available.
1985] ARTISTS' RIGHTS
writing.' 4 9 In Europe, moral right is technically unwaivable,
but reasonable allowances in the courts accommodate both the
artist's right in his work and the owner's right in his prop-
erty, 15 as does CAPA.
CAPA protects both integrity and paternity with a full
range of remedies,' but the rights themselves are somewhat
more limited than they are in Europe. The integrity subsection
of CAPA forbids intentional mutilation or destruction of a
work of fine art.1 52 CAPA differs from moral right in the re-
quirement of intent and makes proof of the artist's case very
difficult. A gross negligence standard, however, applies to
those who undertake to prepare a work for display, or who
conserve or restore it.' 53 The paternity right is limited to the
right to claim, or to disclaim for "just and valid reason" au-
thorship of a work.' 54  The 'just and valid reason" standard
for a disclaimer of authorship is similar to the "recognized
quality" standard discussed above and may be criticized on
similar grounds.' 55 The statute is silent as to the content of
the standard; the courts must define the concept.' 5 6 The pa-
149. CAL. CIv. CODE § 98 7 (g)(3).
150. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e). The artist may sue for injunctive relief, actual
and punitive damages, attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees, and any other relief the
court is inclined to grant. Id. This presumably includes the "labelling remedy." See
supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. Punitive damages go to the government or
to charity. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(e)(3).
152. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(c)(1). This provision states that: "No person, except
an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art which the artist has created, shall
intentionally commit, or authorize the intentional commission of, any physical deface-
ment, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art." Id. {emphasis ad-
ded).
153. Id. § 987(c)(2). This standard is expressed as follows:
In addition to the prohibitions contained in paragraph (1), no person who
frames, conserves, or restores a work of fine art shall commit, or authorize
the commission of, any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or de-
struction of a work of fine art by any act constituting gross negligence. For
purposes of this section, the term "gross negligence" shall mean the exer-
cise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the belief that there was an
indifference to the particular work of fine art.
Id.
154. Id. § 987(d). "The artist shall retain at all times the right to claim author-
ship, or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine
art." Id.
155. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
156. Note, supra note 137, at 916 n.64. There are numerous problems attendant
on application of this standard by the courts. See id.
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ternity right of CAPA is not much different from that available
in Europe,' 57 given the former's more limited scope158 and du-
ration. 59
CAPA provides that the rights it creates will endure until
the fiftieth anniversary of the artist's death.1 60 There is, how-
ever, a three year statute of limitations. 6 ' This "life plus fifty"
duration is identical to that provided by the Copyright Act of
1976 162 and conforms to the requirements of article 6bis of the
Berne Convention. 63  The rights may be bequeathed 64 but
apparently may only be waived and not transferred inter
vivos.' 65 On these points, CAPA is in accordance with moral
right.
A 1982 amendment to CAPA provides that not-for-profit
artistic organizations may exercise the integrity right in a lim-
ited fashion. 16 6 Given that the artist may be indifferent, unable
to act, or unaware of the impending danger to his work, and
given society's interest in the integrity of its culture, 67 it fol-
157. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. In situations where the art-
ist's name is attached to the work of another or vice-versa, defamation and unfair
competition actions provide some relief.
Although one commentator feels that the artist's sole remedy under CAPA in
cases of breach of the paternity right would be to disclaim authorship of the work,
Note, supra note 137, at 915, it is readily apparent that the full range of remedies
provided in § 987(e), see supra note 151 and accompanying text, is available. Without
them, § 987(d) would provide a hollow right capable of little meaningful exercise.
158. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
159. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
160. CAL. CIV. CODE § 9 8 7 (g)(1). "The rights and duties created under this sec-
tion: (1) Shall, with respect to the artist, or if any artist is deceased, his heir, legatee,
or personal representative, exist until the 50th anniversary of the death of such art-
ist." Id.
161. Id. § 987(i). "No action may be maintained to enforce any liability under
this section unless brought within three years of the act complained of or one year
after discovery of such act, whichever is longer." Id. There is some question as to
when "discovery" occurs. See Note, supra note 137, at 933 n.141 for a discussion of
the problems involved.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
163. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art 6bis; see supra notes 91-92 and accompa-
nying text.
164. CAL. CIv. CODE § 9 8 7 (g)(1). The provision implies that the artist may
choose who is to exercise the rights after his death. See id.
165. Id. § 987(g)(3). This section provides for written waiver of the rights. Id.
Transfer of the rights is not mentioned in CAPA.
166. Id. § 989.
167. Id. § 989(a). "The Legislature hereby finds and declares that there is a
public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations." Id.
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lows that agencies other than the artist should be able to pro-
tect the integrity of artworks. 168 Artworks falling within the
ambit of the amendment are those of fine art protected by
CAPA that are also "of substantial public interest."' 169 As with
"recognized quality," this standard is to be determined by the
trier of fact. 17 0 A qualified artistic organization171 may exercise
only the CAPA integrity right and may sue only for injunctive
relief.172 As with the artist's integrity right, special provisions
apply where the artwork is part of a building.
173
Although CAPA has yet to be challenged in the courts,
74
168. The same conclusion was reached by the French parliament. See supra note
87 and accompanying text. A waiver of rights under § 98 7 (g)(3) will bind the organi-
zation with respect to works that are part of real property. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 989(e)(1).
169. CAL. CIv. CODE § 989(b)(1). "As used in this section: (1) 'Fine art' means
an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass, of
recognized quality, and of substantial public interest." Id.
170. Id. § 989(d). "In determining whether a work of fine art is of recognized
quality and of substantial public interest the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of
those described in subdivision (f) of Section 987." Id.
171. CAPA defines a qualified artistic organization as:
[A] public or private not-for-profit entity or association, in existence at least
three years at the time an action is filed pursuant to this section, a major
purpose of which is to stage, display, or otherwise present works of art to
the public or to promote the interests of the arts or artists.
Id. § 989(b)(2). Included in this category are the California Arts Council and Artists'
Equity. Note, supra note 137, at 933 n.140.
172. CAL. CIv. CODE § 989(c). "An organization acting in the public interest
may commence an action for injunctive relief to preserve or restore the integrity of a
work of fine art from acts prohibited by subdivision (c) of Section 987." Id. The court
may also award attorney's fees and expert witness' fees to prevailing parties. Id.
§ 989(0.
173. Id. § 989(e). The restrictions are more extensive than those in § 987(h).
No action may be brought unless there is a minimal showing that the work can be
removed without substantial damage and the plaintiff is prepared to pay for removal.
Id. § 989(e). The action must commence within 30 days of filing. Id. The owner may
also give 30 days' notice to the artist to remove the work, or 30 da's' concurrent
notice by publication directed at any organizations which may remove i:he work if the
artist does not. Id. If neither the artist nor any organizations act to remove the work,
the rights under CAPA no longer apply. Id.
It is not clear that any difference is intended by the use of "building" in § 987(h)
and the use of "real property" in § 989.
174. In the one reported case construing CAPA, Jacobs Inc. v. Westoaks Real-
tors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 205 Cal. Rptr. 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), the Court of
Appeal, Second District held that architectural drawings were prepared in a commer-
cial context and thus were not "fine art" within the definition and scope of CAPA. Id.
at 644, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 624. The paucity of cases construing CAPA since its enact-
ment may indicate that 1) the statute is so well constructed that it discourages all
challenges; 2) the problems it is designed to address are in fact rare occurrences; or
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it should withstand constitutional challenges.1 75 CAPA thus
stands as a limited though laudable step towards greater pro-
tection of artists and artworks. Its endorsement of the policies
underlying moral right helps to fill the void of moral right pro-
tection in the United States.
B. The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act
On August 8, 1983, the New York State Legislature en-
acted the Artist's Authorship Rights Act 176 (AARA) as an at-
tempt to redress the deleterious effects suffered by artists
whose work is mutilated or altered.1 77 Nevertheless, the law
only protects the paternity right.1 78 AARA applies only to
3) the statute acts as an incentive for cooperation between artists and art owners, and
potential lawsuits are resolved by negotiation.
175. See Note, supra note 143, at 1231-40. It is concluded that CAPA will with-
stand a fifth amendment "takings clause" challenge or a supremacy clause challenge.
Id.
176. N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.51 (McKinney 1984).
177. The legislative findings and purpose of the statute were expressed as fol-
lows:
The legislature finds that New York state is the home of many artists of
international repute and that the physical state of a work of fine art is of
enduring and crucial importance to the artist and the artist's reputation.
The legislature further finds that there have been cases where works of art
may have been altered, defaced, mutilated or modified thereby destroying
the integrity of the artwork and sustaining a loss to the artist and the artist's
reputation.
The legislature therefore finds that there are circumstances when an artist
has the legal right to object to the alteration, defacement, mutilation or
other modification of his or her work which may be prejudicial to his or her
career and reputation and that further the artist should have the legal right
to claim or disclaim authorship for [sic] a work of art.
Artists Authorship Rights Act, ch. 994, § 1, 1983 N.Y. Laws 1933-34.
178. N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.55. The history of AARA reflects
pressures imposed on the legislature to narrow the coverage of the law. The original
bill, A.7157, 1981-1982 Reg. Sess., was introduced in the Assembly in 1981. It was
similar to CAPA in all respects, except that it would permit the complete destruction
of a work of art. Id. It specifically acknowledged the state's interest in the integrity of
artworks, a feature omitted from the 1982 bill, A.9477, 1982-1983 Reg. Sess., which
was otherwise very similar. The 1983 bill, A.5052, 1983-1984 Reg. Sess., ch. 994,
1983 N.Y. Laws 1933, omitted many elements of CAPA. The 1983 bill's sponsor,
Assemblyman Richard N. Gottfried, wrote to Governor Mario Cuomo's office that:
Early versions of the bill sought to give the artist the right to prevent de-
struction or alteration of his or her art work in the hands of subsequent
owners. It became clear that the practical, political, legal and constitutional
obstacles to such legislation were large and complex. Thus, the bill now
before the Governor in no way interferes with an owner's right to destroy or
alter a work of art at will. Instead, it focuses on protecting the name and
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"works of fine art,"'' 79 defined by a nonexclusive list of media
including limited editions of photographs or sculptures, but
excluding motion pictures, literary works, and other nonvisual
or nongraphic works.1 80
AARA also specifies that "works prepared under contract
for advertising or trade use" are not protected in the absence
of a contractual provision reserving the artists' rights. 181 It for-
bids the knowing display'8 2 in a public place, of mutilated or
altered works without the artist's consent where the work is
reasonably likely to be regarded as the artist's and damage to
his reputation is a reasonably likely result. 183 Subsequent dis-
play of a work damaged by the passage of time, maintenance or
protective work, or conservation 8 4 is not a violation of AARA
unless the maintenance allowing the work to deteriorate was
right of authorship of the artist. The thrust of the bill is simply this: an
artist will not be able to stop an owner from altering a work of art, but at
least the artist will then be able to keep his or her name from being wrongly
associated with it.
Letter from Assemblyman Richard N. Gottfried to Hon. Alice Daniel, Counsel to
Governor Mario Cuomo (July 5, 1983).
179. N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.53.
180. Id. § 14.51(5). A "work of fine art" is defined as:
any original work of visual or graphic art of any medium which includes, but
is not limited to, the following: painting; drawing; print; photographic print
or sculpture of a limited edition of not more than three hundred copies;
provided however, that "work of fine art" shall not include sequential im-
agery such as that in motion pictures.
Id.
181. Id. § 14.57(4).
182. Id. § 14.57(5). The provision limits the scope of the article to "fine art
knowingly displayed in a place accessible to the public, published or reproduced
*. Id. Thus a mutilated work displayed in the home of a recluse would not
violate the act. For the nonreclusive art collector, applicability of AARA will hinge
on the courts' construction of place accessible to the public.
183. Id. § 14.53. This section provides that:
Except as limited by section 14.57 of this article, no person other than the
artist or a person acting with the artist's consent shall knowingly display in a
place accessible to the public or publish a work of fine art of that artist or a
reproduction thereof in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if
the work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the work of the
artist, or under circumstances under which it would reasonably be regarded
as being the work of the artist, and damage to the artist's reputation is rea-
sonably likely to result therefrom.
Id. (emphasis added).
184. "Conservation" is defined as meaning "acts taken to correct deterioration
and alteration and acts taken to prevent, stop or retard deterioration . .Id.
§ 14.51(2).
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grossly negligent 8 5 or the conservation was negligent. 8 6 Be-
cause the offense forbidden by AARA is the display of a work
and not its alteration or mutilation alone,'87 AARA does not
protect the integrity right but only the paternity right. This is
more explicit in the provision concerning the artist's right to
claim authorship of a work, or for just and valid reason, to dis-
claim authorship of a work.' 88  This right is not waivable or
transferable,' 89 but the artist may consent to otherwise forbid-
den display of his works.' 90
Although AARA does not specifically provide a duration
for the rights it creates, the Act's reference only to "the artist"
and not to his heirs or executors strongly suggests that the
rights expire with the artist's life.' 9' There is also no provision
for pre or post mortem enforcement of the rights by third par-
185. Id. § 14.57(1). The gross negligence standard is expressed as follows:
Alteration, defacement, mutilation or modification of a work of fine art re-
sulting from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials will
not by itself create a violation of section 14.53 of this article or a right to
disclaim authorship under subdivision one of section 14.55 of this article;
provided such alteration, defacement, mutilation or modification was not
the result of gross negligence in maintaining or protecting the work of fine
art.
Id.
186. Id. § 14.57(3). "Conservation shall not constitute an alteration, deface-
ment, mutilation or modification within the meaning of this article, unless the conser-
vation work can be shown to be negligent." Id. The "conservation" and "mainte-
nance" provisions may be distinguished by the more active nature of the former and
the passivity of the latter, which does not alter the work except through retarding,
rather than attempting to reverse the ravages of time.
187. Id. § 14.53.
188. Id. § 14.55(1). The provision reads as follows:
Except as limited by section 14.57 of this article, the artist shall retain at all
times the right to claim authorship, or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim
authorship of his or her work of fine art. The right to claim authorship shall
include the right of the artist to have his or her name appear on or in con-
nection with the work of fine art as the artist. . . . Just and valid reason for
disclaiming authorship shall include that the work of fine art has been al-
tered, defaced, mutilated or modified other than by the artist, without the
artist's consent, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to
result or has resulted therefrom.
Id.
189. Id. § 14.55(1). "[T]he artist shall retain at all times the right to claim au-
thorship .... " Id. There is no mention in AARA that persons other than the artist
may exercise this or other rights.
190. Id. § 14.53(1). The section provides that "no person other than the artist
or a person acting with the artist's consent shall knowingly display ..... Id.
191. See id. §§ 14.51(1), 14.53, 14.55(1), 14.59(1).
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ties or organizations. AARA claims are subject to a statute of
limitations of three years from the offending act, or one year
after its constructive discovery. 9 ' An aggrieved artist may sue
for injunctive or legal relief.'9 3 Presumably costs, attorney's
and expert witness' fees, and punitive damages are ex-
cluded.' 94
A recent case in New York raised AARA as an issue. 195 A
well-known artist contracted with the owner of a building in
Manhattan'9 6 for permission to prepare a mural on the build-
ing's rear exterior wall by periodically sandblasting the wall in
various patterns. New tenants started extensive renovations of
the building and objected to the work when it was still incom-
plete. In the spring of 1983, the new tenants refused to allow
the artist to continue work. The artist obtained a preliminary
injunction to prevent defendants from interfering with the
completion and integrity of the art work. The court based only
part of its decision on AARA. The court noted thai defend-
ants, in denying the artist access to the wall, violated the "spirit
and letter" of AARA because of the public display of the work
in an unfinished form to the detriment of the artist's reputa-
tion.' 97
IV. ANALYSIS
There are a number of similarities and differences among
AARA, CAPA, and European law. AARA's purpose focuses on
the artist's reputation,198 while CAPA and the doctrine of
192. Id. § 14.59(2). "No action may be maintained to enforce any liability under
this article unless brought within three years of the act complained of or one year
after the constructive discovery of such act, whichever is longer." Id.
193. Id. § 14.59(1). "An artist aggrieved under section 14.53 or section 14.55 of
this article shall have a cause of action for legal and injunctive relief." d.
194. Earlier versions of AARA specifically included these remedies. See supra
note 178.
195. Newmann v. Delmar Realty Co., No. 2955-84 slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr.
26, 1984). The facts of the case, as discussed textually infra, have been gleaned from
Manhattan Wall Spurs a Test Case Over Art, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1984, at 1, rcol. 4; Tele-
phone interview with Richard Altman, Counsel for Plaintiff (Apr. 9, 1985).
196. The building at issue is the Palladium, a theater between East 13th and
14th Streets in New York City. The wall at issue faces 13th Street.
197. Newmann v. Delmar Realty Co., No. 2955-84, slip op. at 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 26, 1984).
198. The statement of AARA's legislative purpose does not mention any inter-
ests but the artist's. See supra note 178.
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moral right in Europe also acknowledge social interests in the
integrity or correct attribution of artworks. 99 In its scope,
AARA is broader than CAPA but not nearly as broad as moral
right. The definition of "fine art" in AARA2 0° avoids the judg-
mental problems entailed by the subjective limitation of "rec-
ognized quality" imposed by CAPA20 ' and also comes closer to
the universal scope of moral right.20 2 The exclusion of
nonvisual and cinematic works from both United States laws
reflects pressure from the great industries that process and
produce these works. Similar pressures resulted in the exclu-
sion by both CAPA20 3 and AARA 204 of work prepared under
contract for advertising and trade.20 5
AARA explicitly protects only the paternity right,20 6 in
contrast to CAPA's protection of both paternity and integ-
rity.2 7 This limited protection is linked to New York's failure
to assert a state interest in the condition of artworks. The "just
and valid reason" limitation to the right in both AARA 2°8 and
CAPA20 9 represents an acknowledgment of the high monetary
value of art which may be severely reduced by an artist's dis-
claimer of authorship. CAPA may be construed to imply that
mutilation or alteration constitutes a 'just and valid reason"
for disclaimer.210 Yet the elucidation of other 'just and valid
reasons" is left to the courts. AARA's language makes it clear
that the display of mutilated works, and not the mutilation, is
199. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing CAPA); supra note 87
and accompanying text (discussing moral right).
200. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. A "recognized quality"
standard was included in the 1981 bill, A.7157, see supra note 183, but did not appear
in the 1982 bill, A.9477, see id. This omission makes litigation much simpler. The
"recognized quality" standard functions as a regulating mechanism to keep trivial or
frivolous cases out of court. It is possible that New York substituted an omission of
the integrity right for this standard in order to cut down on the volume of cases.
201. See supra note 142-44 and accompanying text.
202. Moral right applies to all works of whatever form or medium and without
regard to subjective quality. See generally S. LADAS, supra note 5, at 585-94.
203. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
205. Under moral right, the courts also acknowledge these pressures. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
208. N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.55.
209. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d).
210. Id. § 987(c)-(d).
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the offending activity.2 '
The interaction of AARA's prohibition of the display of
mutilated works and its disclaimer provisions is unclear.
Where an artist has disclaimed an unmutilated work for just
and valid reason, he may clearly require that his name no
longer appear in connection with the work.212 If the work's
authorship is not readily identifiable it may be displayed pub-
licly, as no damage to the artist's reputation could result. 213 If
the work could reasonably be regarded as the artist's work
even in the absence of his name, it could still be displayed as
long as it is not specifically identified as the artist's work.2 14
The statute does not indicate whether labelling the work with
the artist's disclaimer is required. Such a label should logically
be required to protect the rights of the artist who would other-
wise continue to be associated with the work even though he
has disclaimed it.2 15
If the labelling remedy were to exist, its applicability
would be limited to situations where a "just and valid reason"
for disclaimer is present. Where a work has been both muti-
lated and disclaimed, labelling may identify the disclaiming art-
ist and inadvertently damage his reputation. In this situation,
it is not clear if a mutilated work labelled as disclaimed could
be displayed. Because a disclaimer label may imperf-ectly dis-
associate the artist from his work, the work therefore should
not be displayed.
AARA's prohibition of display and its affirmation of the
right to disclaim authorship apply only where "damage to the
artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result" from the alter-
ation or mutilation of the work.2 16 With the exception of the
right to claim authorship, AARA suffers from the same short-
comings as defamation; namely, for a remedy to exist an artist
must have a reputation to protect. 217 Although a work of an
unknown artist could be mutilated and displayed with impu-
211. N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.53.
212. Id. § 14.55.
213. Id. § 14.53.
214. Id. Section 14.53 only forbids public display if the work is altered, defaced,
mutilated or modified. Id. It is silent to display of disclaimed works.
215. It is unclear, however, that labelling would provide an adequate remedy, as
works labelled would continue to be identified with the artist.
216. Id. §§ 14.53, 14.55(1).
217. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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nity, such actions would create a circular trap. If the artist as-
serts his right of paternity, he will be prospectively damaged by
the association of his name with a mutilated work; but if he
does not assert his right, he remains unknown. Thus, the artist
is afforded no protection until he gains notoriety. Reputation
is not required under either moral right or CAPA. CAPA,
however, requires the protected art to be "of recognized qual-
ity."' 21 8 This is, in practical effect, a limitation of similar sever-
ity.
Like CAPA, AARA provides a more relaxed standard for
conservators of artworks. Under AARA, damage resulting
from conservation efforts must be due to negligence,2 ' 9 and
damage from maintenance must be due to gross negligence.22 °
This is a stricter standard than that of CAPA22' and allays the
fears of art owners that they will inadvertently render their
works undisplayable.
The statute of limitations provided by AARA is gener-
ous.222 Although its term is identical to that of CAPA,223 the
relevant offense from which the clock runs is the display of a
work, not its mutilation. Only when the display is complete
does the statute begin to run. Each subsequent display is a
new event that violates the act. Although it is not clear what
effect this might have on damages, the artist whose work is dis-
played for a long period has additional time in which to dis-
cover the offense.
A major flaw of AARA is its apparent limitation of the pa-
ternity right to the artist's lifetime.22 4 It makes clear the close
similarity between AARA and defamation where the cause of
action also expires with the one whose reputation it vindicates.
Like the nontransferability of AARA's rights225 and the inabil-
ity of other organizations to exercise them for or instead of the
artist,2 26 this duration flows from the legislature's limited pur-
218. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2); see supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
219. N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAW § 14.57(3).
220. Id. § 14.57(1).
221. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(2).
222. N.Y. ART & CULTURAL AFF. LAw § 14.59(2).
223. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(i).
224. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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pose in enacting AARA.2 "7 AARA falls short of the liberal re-
quirements of article 6bis of the Berne Convention 221 because
it does not recognize the integrity right at all.
CONCLUSION
The New York law for the protection of artists' rights is a
weak shadow of the protection available in California, let alone
in Europe. It protects only the paternity rights, and is similar
in a number of ways to the relief available under def'amation.
It creates rights that endure only as long as the artist is alive
and is directed exclusively to protecting his reputation.
Although the New York Legislature is to be lauded for its en-
actment three years after the introduction of the first bill sug-
gesting it and for the breadth of its definition of art, it is far
less efficacious than the California law at protecting artists in
almost every other respect. It provides an incomplete model
for initial legislation in other states and does not provide rec-
ognition of moral right adequate to allow the United States to
ratify the Berne Convention and enjoy its reciprocal benefits.
A nationwide enactment of laws based on the New York law,
however, would at least acknowledge the concept of moral
right.
227. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. The limited absent characteris-
tics may be most effectively justified in terms of society's interest in the preservation
of its culture. This interest is a legislative justification for CAPA but not for AARA.
228. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis; see supra notes 89-95 and accom-
panying text.
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